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Rhetorical Action and Constitutive Politics
Abstract: This article reconstructs the concept of rhetorical action
to excavate its original, recurrent, and—for many—discomforting
links to constitutive politics. By examining the history of rhetori-
cal action through the ancient period to the mid-17th century, I
will argue that that relationship between rhetorical action and
constitutive politics is a powerful prism for understanding actio.
The article’s contributions are twofold and compounding. The
first is the establishment of a positive account of the relation
between actio and constitutive rhetoric for the ancient politicians
and early modern dramatists, which pushes the usual bookends
of actio’s history both backward and forward, providing analyti-
cal leverage to critically reflect on its standard history. The sec-
ond contribution is a demonstration that much of the confusion
and discomfort surrounding actio results from formulating actio
negatively against its constitutive political threat. In sum, this
article contributes to both the theoretical and historical under-
standing of rhetorical action.
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INTRODUCTION
T
his article reconstructs the concept of rhetorical action to ex-
cavate its original, recurrent, and—for many—discomforting
links to constitutive politics. The study spans the ancient to
the earlymodern periods, ending in themid-17th century. Before setting
out my arguments, allow me to briefly consider a few signposts in
the standard history of actio to frame my intended contribution.
From first to last, philosophers and rhetoricians have struggled with
and against actio. Plato, rather unpersuasively, conflated actio with
politics and went to philosophical war against the practice.
Aristotle noted that delivery “has the greatest force but has not yet
been taken in hand.”1 That is, it was acknowledged as being of the
utmost importance, though rhetoricians had not yet been able to
theoretically circumscribe exactly what its power was, or how it
could be extricated from its vulgar and popular connections.
Cicero described actio similarly as a “vast and indeed incredible
power” with a capacity to make “any impression on the unlearned
crowd.”2 Yet, while deprecating the idea, Cicero’s also idealized it in
the person of the mythical orator-founder. Skipping ahead, by the
17th century (where my historical reconstruction ends) most rhetori-
cians had stopped considering actio altogether, much as contemporary
commentators have. There are exceptions, but they only deepen the
puzzlement surrounding actio. For example, John Bulwer’s Chirologia
(1644) takes the subject “in hand” quite literally, detailing and sketch-
ing how orators should use gestures to persuade audiences. The issue
here is that if Bulwer did finally fulfil Aristotle’s desire for a thorough-
going technical explication of actio, he does so at the cost of scuttling
actio in its full political sense. These signposts are indicative of a ten-
dency for accounts of actio to oscillate between themythic and themun-
dane, with grandiose claims of political power (vulgar or idealized) and
technical accounts that seem unrelated to that power.
I will reconstruct a history of actio that prioritizes its connection to
constitutive politics.3 Most generally, the driving thesis of this article is
1Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy,
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1403b–4a.
2Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Oratore Book III, De Fato, Paradox Stoicorum, De
Partitione Oratoria, ed. G. P. Goold, trans. H. Rackham, vol. IV, The Loeb Classic
Library (Cambridge: William Heinemann Ltd, 1977), 3.1.195–7.
3I will use the term “constitutive rhetoric” throughout this article. There is limited
literature on constitutive rhetoric, which focuses primarily on 20th century theorists.
For a general overview, see Thomas O. Sloane, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” in Encyclopedia
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that constitutive politics are the black hole of rhetoric that philosophers
and rhetoricians have struggled against in myriad ways. By “constitu-
tive politics,” I mean the politics related to the construction of a polity’s
political identity, often inmoments of political emergency, and often in
ways that allow the people to act in concert to address these crises.
I will show that actio’s relationship with constitutive politics is a
powerful prism for understanding actio, yielding insights into both
its theory and history. The article’s contributions are twofold and
compounding. The first is a positive account of the connection between
actio and constitutive rhetoric in the ancient and early modern periods.
These accounts are usually left out of the standard history of actio, and
there is descriptive and analytical value to their expression.4 The two
instances I examine are the initial account by the eminent founders
and politicians of ancient Greece, and the striking return to the ideas
of constitutive rhetorical action by the English dramatists. This first
contribution pushes the bookends of the history of action both forward
and backward. It yields important analytical leverage for critically
reflecting on the standard history of actio and, thus, frames the other
contribution.
The second contribution presents the confusion and discomfort
sketched above (and in detail below) as an output of the tendency of
philosophers and rhetoricians to formulate actio negatively against
the ever-present threat constitutive rhetorical action poses to consti-
tuted regimes. We see this crudely and unpersuasively in Plato’s
founding philosophical assault on constitutive rhetorical action, and
more obliquely—but effectively—in Aristotle criticism of delivery.
Henceforth, rhetoricians have understood actio in various negative, ide-
alized, or routinizedways, but rarely in terms of its original constitutive
manifestation. Nevertheless, the positive manifestation is always dis-
comforting as a political threat against constituted regimes—and, as
will be shown, one common tact is to sing high praises to the over-
whelming political power of actiowhile simultaneously avoiding those
politics. Thus, the aforementioned extremes to which actio has been
pulled expresses and replicates a longstanding assault on the idea of
rhetorical action in its constitutive mode—often passively, but to
the same end.
of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); see also Maurice Charland,
“Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois,” Quarterly Journal of Speech
73, no. 2 (1987): 133–50.
4Examples of surveys of rhetoric that leave out substantive considerations of actio
include Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Quentin
Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
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Both moves—asserting the link between actio and constitutive poli-
tics, andmoving the bookends back and forth—unfold through a survey
of actio’s history. The survey, and the article’s structure, is organized as
follows:
1) The pre-philosophical beginning of actio in spectacular constitutive
politics;
2) The philosophical counterattack, including the assault upon and
reconfiguration of actio in Plato and Aristotle;
3) The transformation and mystification of actio in Cicero and Quintilian;
4) The whittling of actio down to pronunciation and gestures;
5) The re-discovery of and return to actio by sixteenth and seventeenth
century dramatists.
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS
The history of rhetoric is replete with celebrations of—and assaults
on—a series of ancient political figures, both Greek and Roman. These
figures are typically great political actors who deploywhat subsequent
commentators have broadly stylized as actio. Four figures stand out:
Solon, Pericles, Themistocles, and Demosthenes. While these exem-
plary figures act as touchstones for the whole rhetorical tradition, it
is crucial to explicate their significance on their own terms, and not
those of the rhetorical tradition that followed.
Consider first Solon. Plutarch tells of a corrupted Athenian polis
that, tired of fighting the Megarians for control of Salamis, passed a
law banning all public utterances promoting a renewal of hostilities.
This peace, however, was bought at the price of pride and integrity.
Although many wanted to go to war again, none would disobey the
law. Solon, Plutarch tells us, “could not endure the disgrace,” “com-
posed some elegiac verses, and after rehearsing them so that he could
say them by rote, he sallied out in the market-place.”5 Plutarch does
not write of Solon’s use of gestures in particular, but conveys a more
general account of the popular and theatrical spectacle that was essen-
tial to the persuasive delivery of the speech. Feigning madness and
addressing a large crowd “with a cap upon his head,” he stood on
5Plutarch, Lives: Theseus and Romulus, Lycurgus and Numa, Solon and Publicola,
trans. Bernadotte Perrin, vol. I, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967), Solon.8.
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the “herald’s stone and recited the poem.”6 Having won the praise of
his friends and fellow citizens for his poem, Solon proceeded to suc-
cessfully overturn the law against aggression, ultimately going on to
command the war against Salamis. “At this point,” Plutarch writes,
“the wisest of the Athenians cast their eyes upon Solon. They saw
that he was the one man least implicated in the errors of the time.”7
Solon was viewed as prudent, transcending partisan and economic
divisions, and above all else, committed to the well-being of the polity.
Consequently, “their chief men persistently recommended a tyranny
to Solon, and tried to persuade him to seize the city all the more confi-
dently now that he had it completely in his power.”8 Not only did
Solon facilitate the constitution of a new political identity, his powers
of persuasion were so thoroughgoing that the people took themselves
to be authors of that new identity.
Solon’s deployment of persuasion and his political deeds were
synergistic undertakings. James Fredal writes that in Solon, as with
Theseus,
we see a similar pattern of elements: the function of the herald gather-
ing a people together into a common space to constitute a united force
under arms, a political intervention at a sacred festival, the use of dis-
guise and impersonation . . . for political ends, [and] the centrality of a
performative politics that orchestrates symbolic resources to direct united
action.9
Fredal is correct. The weight of the symbolic reconstruction of
Athenian identity was born by the charisma and eminence manifest
in Solon’s spectacular and ultimately persuasive actions. Solon may
have learned his poem by rote, but his persuasiveness was not establis-
hed upon a mastery of rhetorical theory. Solon’s deeds were facilitated
bywhat is variously ascribed to as a “natural gift” of persuasion, with-
out which he would have been unsuccessful. Solon is never portrayed
as an especially gifted rhetorician; he is instead shown as having a spe-
cial gift of character, foresight, and political acumen. Solon’s rhetorical
deeds were grounded in concrete political acts of great and evident
import conjoined to charismatic leadership and great political deeds.
6Plutarch, I:Solon.8. See also Demosthenes, Demosthenes, Speeches 18 And 19, ed.
Harvey Yunis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 188–89.
7Plutarch, Lives, 1967, I:Solon.14.1.
8Plutarch, I:Solon.14.3.
9James Fredal, Rhetorical Action In Ancient Athens: Persuasive Artistry from Solon to
Demosthenes (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2006), 41 [emphasis
added]. See also, Harvey Yunis, Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in
Classical Athens (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 223–24.
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Solon’s rhetoric is exemplary of what would much later be styl-
ized as actio; it is this context that gives his rhetorical deeds their
importance. The subsequent stylization of the rhetorical arts were, as
we have seen, already prefigured by anxieties surrounding the power
of constitutive rhetoric in destabilizing the constituted order. Hence,
these accounts—though unencumbered by the judgments and theori-
zations of the philosophers—allow us to begin grasping what the
philosophers were writing against. They focus our attention on the
special powers of great rhetorical-political deeds, when existential
threats to the polity were otherwise ignored due to political torpidity,
social strife, and moral equivocation. Likewise, it draws our attention
to the role of rhetoric in the construction of new regimes and new iden-
tities. Solon is recorded as having united a divided and corrupt
Athenian society while implementing reforms that, although not
immediately effective, would eventually secure the constitutional
foundation upon which Athens would flourish in the following centu-
ries. The story is also interesting because it foretells a modality of social
covenanting. Here, it suffices to flag Plutarch’s description of the
moment: “When Solon had sung it [his poem], his friends began to
praise him, and Peisistratus in particular urged and incited the citizens
to obey his words. They therefore repealed the law and renewed the
war, putting Solon in command of it.”10 It is a constitutive moment
wherein a corrupt and lethargic established order is overturned and
a new one established—all on the backs of a persuasively delivered
poem. It is a “constitutive” moment, because the poem does not sim-
ply persuade the audience. It reconfigures their identities and establis-
hes their cohesion as a people. The case for this conjunction becomes
stronger as the historical evidence becomes more robust.
Themistocles is another example of a natural talent who, from his
youth, had both the gifts and the inclination to use rhetorical persua-
sion in the service of great deeds. As with the other orator-founders/
leaders discussed here, the measure of Themistocles’s rhetorical exhor-
tation was his contribution to the well-being of the polis. The most
rousing encomium of Themistocles is found in Thucydides:
Themistocles was indeed amanwho displayed beyond doubt, andmore
than any other, natural genius to a quite exceptional and awesome
degree. Through the pure application of his own intelligence, and with-
out the aid of any briefing or debriefing, he was a consummate judge of
the needs of the moment at very short notice, and supreme in conjectur-
ing the future, more accurate than any in his forecast of events as they
10Plutarch, Lives, 1967, I:Solon.8.
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would actually happen. He had the gift of explaining clearly all that he
himself undertook, and was not lacking in competent judgement on
matters outside his experience: and he foresaw better than any the pos-
sible advantage and disadvantage in a yet uncertain future. In summary,
the intuitive power of his mind and the speed of his preliminary thought
gave Themistocles an unrivalled ability to improvise what was needed
at any time.11
Cicero provides a similar rendition to this story. He writes that
Themistocles, “whomwe know to have been pre-eminent in eloquence
as well as in political shrewdness,” was comparable to Pericles, who
was “distinguished in every form of excellence, and especially illustri-
ous in this art”12—namely, the act of establishing a new (or renewed)
political order by means of exemplary rhetorical action. Notably,
Plutarch also remarks that later in his life, Themistocles had won an
award as a “theatrical manager.”13 The relationship between theater
and actio would become an enduring point of derision by subsequent
philosophers and rhetoricians.
Pericles is cast in a similar light. Thucydides writes that Pericles
epitomized prudential thinking, writing that his “power was in his dis-
tinguished reputation and his intellect, and he was patently incorrupt-
ible.”14 Most strikingly, Pericles is said to have “controlled the mass of
the people with a free hand, leading them rather than letting them lead
him.”15 Thucydides writes of Periclean Athens that “what was happen-
ing was democracy in name, but in fact the dominion of the leading
man.”16 Pericles transcended regular politics, and the steady decay of
Athens in his wake was a direct result of subsequent attic orators who
were “more on a level with one another, and because each was striving
for first position they were inclined to indulge popular whim even in
matters of state policy.”17 Plutarch writes that Pericles deployed a novel
form of rhetoric that provided “himself with a style of discourse which
was adapted, like a musical instrument, to his mode of life and the
grandeur of his sentiments.” This style was noted for “subtly mingling”
11Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Martin Hammond (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), I.138.
12Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, Orator, ed. E. H. Warmington, trans. G. L.
Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbell, vol. V, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971), Brutus.28.
13Plutarch, Lives: Themistocles and Camillus. Aristides and Cato Major, Cimon and
Lucullus, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, vol. II, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968), Themistocles.5.
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the rhetorical arts and the natural sciences. Like Themistocles, his was
also a highly theatrical style described as “thundering” and “lightening
[sic]” when he scolded his audience, as if he was “wielding a dread
thunderbolt in his tongue.” Pericles excelled in conjoining rhetorical
practice and philosophy. “It was from natural science,” Plutarch conti-
nues (quoting Plato), that Pericles “acquired his loftiness of thought
and perfectness of execution, in addition to his natural gifts.”18
Plutarch writes that Pericles alone could bring unity to the dispa-
rate peoples of the empire:
[H]e alone was so endowed by nature that he could manage each one of
these cases suitably, and more than anything else he used the people’s
hopes and fears, like rudders, so to speak, giving timely check to their
arrogance, and allaying and comforting their despair. Thus he proved that
rhetoric, or the art of speaking, is, to use Plato’s words, ‘an enchantment of
the soul,’ and that her chiefest business is a careful study of the affections
and passions, which are, so to speak, strings and steps of the soul, requir-
ing a very judicious fingering and striking. The reason for his success was not
his power as a speaker merely, but . . . the reputation of his life and the confidence
reposed in him as one who was manifestly proven to be utterly disinterested and
superior to bribes. He made the city, great as it was when he took it, the greatest
and richest of all cities.19
Aristotle tells a similar story in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he styles
Pericles as a paragon of practical wisdom.20 The conjunction of natural
rhetorical gifts, a philosophical inclination, and a magnanimous con-
cern with the common good are all for naught unless realized in prac-
tice. Indeed, none of these attributes exists apart from the political act
itself. Again, the symbolic realm is important, but the political realm
is decisive. As with Solon, the technique is inseparable from the deed,
and the flourishing of the polis is the measure of the political actor.
18Plutarch, Lives: Pericles and Fabius Maximus, Nicias and Crassus, trans. Bernadotte
Perrin, vol. III, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1932),
Pericles.8. Plutarch is paraphrasing Aristophanes here, without noting the critical nature
of Aristophanes’ portrayal of Pericles. Cf. “The Acharnians,” in Aristophanes, trans.
Benjamin Bickley Rogers, vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann
Ltd, 1930), 523–48.
19Plutarch, Lives, 1932, III:Pericles.15 [emphasis added].
20Aristotle writes:
It remains therefore that it is a true and practical state involving reason, concerned
with what is good and bad for a human being. For while production has an end dis-
tinct from itself, this could not be so with action, since the end here is acting well
itself. This is whywe think Pericles and people like him are practically wise, because
they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for people in general.
Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 1140b.
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Demosthenes is perhaps the most cited example of a great orator in
the humanist tradition. Unlike Themistocles, Demosthenes was not a
natural talent. Instead, he had to learn his art. Plutarch begins by noting
the difficulty in tracingDemosthenes’s rhetorical education, as different
sources make contradictory claims concerning the various influences
of Plato, Isocrates, Isaeus, and Alcidamas.21 However, Plutarch writes
that more important than these influences on Demosthenes’s style
was the theatrical influence of “Satyrus the actor.”22 Demosthenes
famously advised that rhetors concern themselves with three things
above all: “delivery, delivery, and delivery,” a dictum that is endlessly
quoted by subsequent rhetoricians (to whom I will turn shortly). What
goes largely without note by these same rhetoricians is that
Demosthenes’s oratorical persuasiveness was not simply a question
of technique. It was also fundamentally intertwined with his politics.
Thus, in On The Crown, Demosthenes recounts his own deeds in
response to the threat posed by Philip of Macedonia. In the fall of 399
BC, Philip had successfully taken Elatea, thereby providing him with a
route to invade Athens. Having received the news:
[T]he Presiding Officers called the Council to the Council-house while
you proceeded to the Assembly, and before the Council could deliber-
ate and endorse a proposal, the entire citizen body was seated up there.
After this, the Council entered and the Presiding Officers announced
the news they had received, and they produced the messenger to give
his report. Then the herald asked, “Who wishes to speak?” but no one
came forward. The herald asked many times but to no avail. No one
rose, though all the generals were present and all the politicians too, and the
country was calling for a speaker to save it. For the voice of the herald lawfully
discharging his task is rightly considered the common voice of the country.23
The response was silence, following which “the one who emerged as the
right man on that day was I. I stepped forward and addressed you.”24 In
a moment of constitutional crisis and amidst an existential threat to
the city—and after every other Athenian fell silent—Demosthenes
alone spoke, thereby bringing order to a fractious and irrational polity.
For Demosthenes, delivery and the wellbeing of the democratic polis
were co-constitutive. As Kennedy notes, Demosthenes “knew all tricks
and rules of rhetoric, but they were to him only means to a far more
21Plutarch, Lives: Demosthenes and Cicero. Alexander and Caesar, trans. Bernadotte
Perrin, vol. VII, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919),
Demosthenes.5.
22Plutarch, VII:Demosthenes.7.
23Demosthenes, Demosthenes, Speeches 18 And 19, paras. 170–1.
24Demosthenes, para. 173.




 http://online.ucpress.edu/rhetorica/article-pdf/37/3/286/240631/rh_2019_37_3_286.pdf by guest on 24 July 2020
important end. As his career developed he made that end the preserva-
tion of Athenian democracy and institutions as he knew them and
recovery of the spirit that hadmade them.”25 Fundamentally, however,
as the italicized passages suggest, this was a constitutive rhetorical
deed. While Demosthenes is celebrated by the humanist rhetoricians,
they have also interpolated Demosthenes’s style in an unduly tech-
nical framework that occludes the constitutive political aspects of
his rhetorical deeds. For his own part, Demosthenes was not look-
ing forward. He was looking back—with urgency—to a tradition
of rhetorical action which had not yet been subordinated to the
theoreticians.
Each of these figures is exemplary of actio still unbound by the
philosopher’s distinction between theory and practice, therefore
unencumbered by the concomitant derision of the democratic
media and theatrical deployment of rhetorical action. The measure
of their greatness is always the flourishing of the polis, the highest
order of which is the successful establishment of a new polity, the
unification of a multitude, and/or the (re)foundation of a regime.
Each of these figures is shown as reacting against the laws, tradi-
tions, and norms which define their political contexts—doing so at
great personal risk and to the immediate antagonism of the popu-
lace—then having those deeds legitimated by subsequent historical
events, affirming their prudence and wisdom. Lastly, in every case,
these acts are resistant to theoretical stylization exactly because they
emerge in the context of extraordinary political moments, and incor-
porate those moments into the rhetorical deed itself. As will be seen
in the next section, these eminently political practices will come
under sustained assault by the philosophers and rhetoricians.
However, it is important to avoid methodological prolepsis and,
as much as possible, describe them in their own terms.
PHILOSOPHICAL CLOISTERS
At the core of Plato’s assault on political life is a comprehensive
attack on the rhetorical arts. Plato’s critique of rhetoric derives from
his critique of the epistemological presumptions of the rhetoricians.26
For Plato, opinion stands in opposition to the philosophically real,
25George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1963), 236.
26On Plato’s assault on rhetoric, see Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, chap. 2.
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the corollary being that politics stands in opposition to philosophy.
The realm of opinion and politics is the realm of language; the realm
of philosophy is the realm of thought and the soul. By its very nature,
rhetoric turns agents away from truth and the soul, while relishing
in publicity and opinion. Plato’s critique of the rhetorical arts is
exhaustive, encompassing critiques of Thrasymachean, Isocratean,
and Gorgian rhetoric.27 Plato’s harshest criticism, however, focuses
on the type of figure delineated above: the revered orator-founders
and leaders (Plato has only slightly less antipathy for the drama-
tists). More than any other aspect of his thought, these attacks exem-
plify Plato’s assault on political life and the idea of rhetorical action
where it is most intimately tied to the vita activa.
By way of example, consider Socrates’s imagined speech to
Homer in the tenth book of Republic:
Socrates: But about the most important and most beautiful things of
which Homer undertakes to speak—warfare, generalship, city govern-
ment, and people’s education—about these it is fair to question him, ask-
ing him this: “Homer, if you’re not third from the truth about virtue, the
sort of craftsman of images that we defined an imitator to be, but if
you’re even second and capable of knowing what ways of life make peo-
ple better in private or in public, then tell us which cities are better
governed because of you, as Sparta is because of Lycurgus, and as many
others—big and small—are because of many other men? What city gives
you credit for being a good lawgiver who benefited it, as Italy and Sicily
do to Charondas, and as we do to Solon? Who gives such credit to you?”
Will he be able to name one?
Glaucon: I suppose not, for not even the Homeridael make that claim
for him.28
Though Plato’s critique here is explicitly directed at Homer, his
praise of the orator-statesman is later revealed as deeply ironic.
Where the poets had never proven their capacity to found new cit-
ies, in Plato’s assessment the orator-founders/statesmen have only
ever acted as catalysts of corruption. In Republic, Themistocles is
27See “Phaedrus,” in Plato: Complete Works, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul
Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 506–56; “Gorgias,” in
Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, trans. Donald J. Zeyl
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 791–869; “Republic,” in Plato:
Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, trans. G. M. A. Grube and
C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 974–1223. See also
Elizabeth Asmis, “Psychagogia in Plato’s Phaedrus,” Illinois Classical Studies 11, no. 1 &
2 (1986): 153–72; Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, chap. 2.
28Plato, “Republic,” l. 599b-e.
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treated in essentially the same way, as are the Seven Sages (includ-
ing Solon) in the Protagoras.29 In Gorgias, Plato certainly attacks the
sophists, but independently takes aim at Themistocles, Cimon,
Miltiades, and Pericles with rather unpersuasive vigor. In Phaedrus,
Pericles is singled out initially as one of the few practitioners of the
rhetorical arts who had “natural ability,” as well having a “lofty point
of view” in reference to questions of “universal applicability.”30
However, as with the founders and poets, this encomium is again
eventually revealed as ironic, and the orator-founders are cast as deba-
sed sophists who wrought destruction and political disorder. Pericles
in particular is cast as a failure because of the fleetingness of his
accomplishments, which were scuttled upon his death.31
Plato doesmake an exception for psychagogia (or “directing the soul
bymeans of speech”32), a form of persuasion corresponding to his epis-
temological claims, which is necessary for the realization of his political
program. Psychagogia aims at gaining access to the soul, and then ruling
over it. Dialogue remains the means through which the philosopher
communicates with interlocutors, but only in private—never in the
public sphere. For only private dialogical rhetoric allows for the consid-
eration of the soul in its particularity. Thus, psychagogia requires turning
away from the public sphere. However, because the forms accessed
through the soul are so thoroughly occluded by opinion, access to the
soul requires that Plato begin by addressing opinion, undermining it,
and finally transcending it. To achieve this goal, the Platonic method
unfolds as an iterative process that begins by enticing the interlocutors
with those opinions the psychagogue ultimately aims to refute. Socrates,
for example, uses myth to win over Phaedrus, or city-building themes
to win over Glaucon in Republic (including insincere praise of the foun-
ders in the aforementioned coaxing of his interlocutors), and proceeds
to incrementally allow the interlocutor to discover for themselves the
supposed fallacy of their own opinions. It is not by chance that the
most famous instance of this involves founding a polity. The realm of
the psychagogue is not the political foundation of a city, but rather its
opposite, the foundation of a “city in logos.” One can hardly think of
a rhetorical mode more dissimilar to that of the orators and founders,
and less conducive to politics of new foundations. Often, it is noted
29Plato, “Protagoras,” in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and
D. S. Hutchinson, trans. Karen Bell and Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett
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that Plato criticizes the use of rhetoric while simultaneously deploying
rhetoric to persuade his readers. Plato’s use of psychagogia could be
similarly construed as a redeployment of action by other means.
However, that would be a mistake. In Plato’s hands, constitutive rhe-
torical action is not criticized so much as it is replaced by its antinomy:
stripped of its performativity, theatricality, and publicity. Psychagogia
demarcates the realm of the philosopher, not the politician. Politics
do follow, but they are the politics of repression and stasis. Plato’s crit-
icism of rhetorical action is perfunctory and crude, but the effective
undermining of constitutive rhetorical action is all-encompassing and
of immense historical consequence.
Aristotle’s turn from Plato’s philosophical abstraction to practice
entails a guardedmove back in the direction of the original understand-
ing of actio, although with great apprehensiveness. Ultimately, this
move was in the service of the cloistering of the concept within regular
political situations. For this reason, we find in Aristotle the sharpest
manifestation of the difficulty of theoretically wrangling the concept of
actio as a political practice, instead of bluntly rejecting it. Rhetoric, for
Aristotle, is an exceptional art, as it alone takes as its object other arts.33
The role of the rhetor is to identify what is persuasive about a particular
art and to present the proofs suitable for persuading their audience of
the truth of the matter. The question of rhetoric, then, is a question
of pisteis, or proofs. Aristotle delineates two general types of proofs:
atechnic, those conditions that are outside the control of the rhetorician
such as “witnesses, testimony from torture, contracts,” and entechnic,
to methods that can be prepared and controlled by the rhetorician.34
The three entechnic proofs are the public perceptions of the speaker’s
character (ethos), the emotions of the listener or audience (pathos), and
the persuasiveness of the argument itself (logos).35 Successful rhetorical
persuasion is contingent on the successful manipulation of these three
factors in the service of proper syllogistic reasoning.
What of actio specifically? In book three ofOn Rhetoric,we find the
first theoretical reflections on actio and its more recognizable connec-
tion to pronuntiatio and acting. In On Rhetoric, Aristotle has very little
to say on these topics, and is indeed quite forthright about the unde-
veloped state of the theory of actio:
The first thing to be examined was naturally that which came first by
nature, the facts from which a speech has persuasive effect; second is
how to compose this in language [lexis]; and third is something that
33Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1355b.
34Aristotle, 1355b.
35Aristotle, 1356a-b.
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has the greatest force but has not yet been taken in hand, the matter of
the delivery [hypokrisis]. Even in regard to tragedy and rhapsody, deliv-
ery was late in coming to be considered; for originally the poets them-
selves acted their tragedies. Clearly there is something like this in
rhetoric, as in poetics.36
Aristotle ascribes the theoretical murkiness of the concept of rhetorical
action to its relative newness as a theoretical concern. However, in ret-
rospect, it seems more correct to say that he hit upon an essential per-
plexity inherent to the thing itself: the widely noted political power of
rhetorical action (“something that has the greatest force”) is a function
of its capacity to overturn old orders and constitute new normative
political horizons, while rhetorical theorization is circumscribed by
constitutional backgrounds and functions under those normative
constraints. Rhetorical action is not a practice or a speech that can be
learned by rote. Rather, it is a practice that takes as its fodder unpre-
dictable political events and fluid social contexts, and whose practitio-
ners are always cast as particularly virtuous and eminent.
Perhaps for these reasons, Aristotle reverts to an essentially
Platonic disposition by conflating his critique of rhetoric with his cri-
tique of democracy. While Aristotle is clear that actio is both undevel-
oped and under-theorized, he is nevertheless certain that it is the
most debased form of rhetoric. Hence, although performers who are
noted for their skill in the deployment of actio “are generally the ones
who win poetic contests”—perhaps a reference to Themistocles—“just
as actors are more important than poets now in the poetic contests, so it
is in political contests because of the sad state of governments.”37 For
this reason, rhetoricians are advised to study delivery “not because it
is right but because it is necessary,” since although the “facts them-
selves” are the foundation of successful rhetoric, “nevertheless, [deliv-
ery] has great power. . . . because of the corruption of the audience.”38
Aristotle understood delivery as inseparable from acting in two
senses. First, they both require a “natural talent,” and are “not reducible
to artistic rule.” However, where delivery intersects with “how things
are said [lexis],” it can be treated in a theoretical manner. Hence, for
Aristotle, delivery as a technique is doubly debased, first insofar as it
is contingent on natural talents, and second because it is always a pub-
lic modality of persuasion. Where it is not natural and can be treated
theoretically, it is necessarily debated. “Whenever delivery comes to
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prizes go to those who are skilled at it, just as they do to orators on the
basis of their delivery; for written speeches [when orally recited] have
greater effect through expression [lexis] than through thought.”39
Aristotle immediately flags his inherent distrust of actio, noting that
it was the rhetor Thrasymachus—who Plato’s had described as assert-
ing the “justice is the advantage of the stronger”40—who asserted the
importance of emotional appeal through delivery. In this regard, deliv-
ery retains for Aristotle the unboundedness and potential power that
was one of its defining features in the political variant of the rhetorical
tradition, although it is recast as democratic, vulgar, and negative.
Nevertheless, Aristotle does openwhat would become an enduring line
of derogatory criticism of actio as an especially effeminate mode of
rhetoric.41
In Poetics, Aristotle’s critique of delivery is deeper still. In the dis-
cussion of tragedy, Aristotle extends his critique of delivery to poetry
more generally. Aristotle defines tragedy as “an imitation of an action
of serious stature and complete, having magnitude, in language made
pleasing in distinct forms in its separate parts, imitating people acting
and not using narration, accomplishing by means of pity and fear the
cleansing of these states of feeling.”42 Tragedy is an imitation of an
event. Story and character are that which is imitated, speech is a means
of imitation, while thought, opsis (spectacle), and song-making are
mimetic objects. Aristotle says that tragedy is an imitation of actions
and life, happiness and wretchedness, but not of human beings.
Therefore, actors should not mimic the person, but rather the moral
actions—story and character—that convey the moral lessons of what
constitutes the higher (or the good) and the lower (or the degraded):
“So the actions performed and the story are the end of tragedy, and
the end is the greatest of all things.”43
39Aristotle, 1404a.
40Plato, “Republic,” 338c.
41Jodi Enders, “Delivering Delivery: Theatricality and the Emasculation of
Eloquence,” Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 15, no. 3 (1997): 253–78.
Enders concludes:
Spanning hundreds of years of Western European thought, the theorists cited
above [Enders addresses many of the theorists that I have addressed] share an
aggressivity of response against one and the same phenomenon. There was some-
thing so powerful about the abstract theories and concrete practices of entities like
‘femininity,’ ‘effeminacy,’ and ‘theater’ that they all proved eminently capable of
detracting from a male speaker’s authority. (Enders, 273.)
42Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Joe Sachs (Newburyport: Focus Publishing, 2006),
1449b25–9.
43Aristotle, 1450a23–5.
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Tragedy “draws the soul” (Aristotle, like Plato, uses the term
psychagogia, though in a broader sense) through “reversals and discov-
eries” that tell stories with an ethical principle, the transgression of
which is recognized as being incongruent with one’s own good. “The
story, then,” Aristotle writes, “is the source and is like the soul of the
tragedy, and states of character rank second.”44 Inverting this analysis
allows us to uncover Aristotle’s critique of spectacle: “Spectacle, while
it is able to draw the soul, is the component most foreign to the art
and least inherent in poetry.”45 Aristotle’s dilemma is that actio is mani-
festly powerful, irrespective of the story. Both in the affairs of the multi-
tude, and within the realm of politics, “the art of making masks and set
decorations has more control over bringing off the spectacle than does
the art of the poets.”46 Here, Aristotle’s preference for the rhetoric used
in forensic rhetoric comes into conflict with the inescapable political fact
of the power of constitutive rhetorical action. Having reluctantly assen-
ted to the vulgar power of tragedy and actio—while denying the actor
any philosophical power in directing the audience towards truth—
Aristotle finally turns to the tragedians themselves. Interestingly, he
notes the peculiarity of the tragedians’ skill. Unlike other rhetorical
techniques, this skill is only found in a “naturally gifted person” or
the “insane,” the difference being that the poet is capable of convey-
ing the passions, while the madman is merely bound by them.47
Another consequence is that the political aspects previously asso-
ciated with rhetorical action (superlative eminence, rare, resistant to
being captured theoretically) lose their naturalism and take on more
mystical and mythical forms. One expression of this unclear idea in
Aristotle—one that oscillates uncomfortably between the ancient tradi-
tion of the orator-founder and Aristotle’s concern with theoretical
compartmentalization—is found in Aristotle’s curious discussion of
the magnanimous man.
The magnanimous man is not usually discussed in terms of
Aristotle’s rhetorical considerations. But he should be. The discussions
of magnanimity in On Rhetoric are limited, because Aristotle’s concern
is with the role of persuasion in constituted regimes, where the rhetori-
cians need to learn how to best navigate pre-given or constituted norms
and institutions. Consequently, in On Rhetoric magnanimity is presen-
ted only as an other-regarding concern. In Nicomachean Ethics and
Politics, however, a fully developed account of the persuasive power
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up the question of magnanimity in the midst of a discussion regarding
the three correct constitutions. Aristotle observes a singular problem:
“In the case of the best constitution”Aristotle writes, “there is a consid-
erable problem, not about superiority in other goods, such as power or
wealth or havingmany friends, but when there happens to be someone
who is superior in virtue.”48 The issue is that there is a kind of virtue
that supersedes all constituted norms, namely magnanimity. Aristotle
speaks of “one person or more than one” who is/are “so outstanding
by reason of his superior virtue that neither the virtue nor the political
power of all the others is commensurable with his.” Aristotle notes
that “such men can no longer be regarded as part of the city-state”49
and would “reasonably be regarded as a god among human beings.”50
Magnanimity, in short, naturally transcends political norms and has
the natural power to constitute new political orders. It is an embodied
constitutive rhetoric quite unlike deliberative, forensic, or epideictic
modes. Hence, Aristotle writes that “people would not say that such
a person should be expelled or banished, but neither would they
say that they should rule over him.” Therefore, “The remaining
possibility—and it seems to be the natural one—is for everyone
to obey such a person gladly, so that those like him will be perma-
nent kings in their city-states.”51 Not a foundational moment or a
re-foundation, not a city in logos, but something that begins to
approximate myth (as will be seen, this is an important juncture
in the history of actio, which Cicero will make much of).
Aristotle’s entire discussion of the character of the magnanimous
man is one of public display and persuasive virtue. Despite that,
the closest Aristotle gets to developing this idea is to note that the
magnanimous man is typically calm, paced, and has a deep voice.52
The similarities between the mode of action criticized by Aristotle in
Poetics and the kind of politics valorized in Nicomachean Ethics and
Politics are striking, as is the seeming avoidance on Aristotle’s part
to develop those similarities.
Commentators are often flustered by Aristotle’s account of
magnanimity, because it seems to be inconsistent with the rest of
48Aristotle, Politics, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1998), 1284b25–8.
49Aristotle, 1283b40–4a17.
50Aristotle, 1284a10 [emphasis added].
51Aristotle, 1284b25–34.
52Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1125a15–20. Jodi Enders notes that Aristotle’s
assault on theatrical action casts the actor as effeminate (see footnote 41, above).
Aristotle’s description of magnanimity could be seen as a step in the idealization of
masculinity.
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Aristotle’s political philosophy. But they may have been misled by
assuming that Aristotle had fully come to grips with the idea. If,
instead, we read the discussion of magnanimity as an inflection
point in the history of actio—one that disaggregates the idea into
its various parts, clarifies the notion in some regards (by disaggre-
gating the theatrical elements from the virtue ethics and by defining
and describing each) and mystifies it in others (for example, by
pushing the figure of the magnanimous man outside the realm of
normal everyday politics while treating those politics as super
human)—we can at least come to a better explanation as to why it
is so fraught. Aristotle himself is struggling to explain a rhetorical-
political phenomenon that functions primarily as a constituting
phenomenon, inexplicable within the settled norms of a constituted
regime. As a response to Plato, Aristotle may be seen to have
allayed many of Plato’s concerns by disaggregating constitutive
rhetorical action into its various parts, construing them in seem-
ingly antithetical ways, and ultimately treating them as entirely dif-
ferent topics. But as the proximity between his accounts of theatrical
action and magnanimity seems to attest, he may not have been
entirely successful. At the end of the day, the core problem remains
unresolved: in practice, it is perhaps impossible to differentiate
seeming magnanimity from practiced hypocrisy, which is almost
exactly the problem that Plato set out to address.53
Nevertheless, in Aristotle’s hands, actio retains a measure of its
inexplicable socio-political power for new beginnings. But he has
clearly embarked upon a path of de-mystification in some regards,
and mystification in others. His systematic subordination of rhetoric
to technical schematization results in a bifurcation of rhetoric into a
vulgar variety attuned to mobs and moments of exceptional politics,
and a rhetoric geared to normal politics. This, too, would prove to be
an enduring discursive move.
ROMAN RECONFIGURATIONS
Beginning fromAristotle’s Rhetoric, but moving decisively beyond
it, Cicero develops the textual-technical elements of rhetoric while
expanding its scope to include figures and tropes. Cicero’s emphasis
is on the means and methods of evincing emotional response and
53I am grateful to the reviewers for their feedback on this section from which I
borrowed the language of the “practiced hypocrite.”
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support, while simultaneously marking a continuation and accelera-
tion of Aristotle’s bifurcation of the concept into regular (proper) and
irregular (vulgar) rhetoric. InDeOratore, Cicero formalizes five aspects
of the rhetorical arts: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio. In
the first instance, actio is defined as the art of pronuntiatio—that is, as
a technique for using the body to convey to an audience the appropri-
ate emotion accompanying the argument. Extending Aristotle’s claim
that rhetoric is the mother of all arts, and taking heed of his discussion
in the Poetics, Cicero asserts that pronuntiatio is the foremost of all the
rhetorical techniques, insofar as its proficient use is a necessary condi-
tion for successful persuasion. All other rhetorical techniques, Cicero
writes, “are but parts of a building as it were; the foundation is mem-
ory; that which gives it light is delivery.”54 Following his exposition of
the other rhetorical techniques, Cicero writes in De Oratore: “the effect
of all of these oratorical devices depends on how they are delivered.”55
Delivery “is the dominant factor in oratory; without delivery the best
speaker cannot be of any account at all.”56
The apparent reprieve of delivery is partly a function of the impor-
tance of the emotions for Cicero and, in turn, the unique capacity of
delivery to connect directly with the emotions. The “vast and indeed
incredible power” that Cicero ascribes to actio—demonstrated in its
capacity to make “any impression on the unlearned crowd”—is
derived from the theory that actio directly accesses core emotional
truths “given by nature” and “rooted deep in the general sensibility,
and nature has decreed that nobody shall be entirely devoid of these
faculties.”57 However, this is not a question of ephemeral or superficial
emotional responses. Rather, emotions reflect the natural force of the
topic at hand. As well as being the most important and powerful of
the rhetorical techniques, actio is the most plebeian. “All the factors
of delivery” Cicero writes:
contain a certain force bestowed by nature; which moreover is the rea-
son why it is delivery that has most effect on the ignorant and the mob
and lastly on barbarians; for words influence nobody but the person
allied to the speaker by sharing the same language, and clever ideas
frequently outfly the understanding of people who are not clever,
whereas delivery, which gives the emotion of the same mind
54Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica, ed.
Jeffrey Henderson, trans. H. M. Hubbell, vol. II, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2006), De Optimo.2.
55Cicero, De Oratore, 1977, IV:3.56.
56Cicero, IV:3.56.
57Cicero, IV:3.50.
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expression, influence everybody, for the same emotions are felt by all
people and they both recognize them in others and manifest them in
themselves by the same marks.58
For Cicero, delivery in conjunction with style gives the orator direct
access to the passions of the multitude. Delivery is unique in this
regard, insofar as it is the only universally understood rhetorical
technique.
Unlike Aristotle’s criticism of actio in its theatrical mode, Cicero
sees actio as revelatory, not deceptive or occluding. The purpose is
not dissimulation or distraction, but simulation of the emotional
weight of the topic at hand through the instantiation of those emo-
tions. This explains why Cicero is so concerned with the resemblance
between history and metaphorical ornamentation, and why propor-
tionality and fit are crucial to the successful use of actio. Nature and
truth are inherently better than their opposite; the role of the rhetor
is tomake this palpable and thereby actionable. Rhetorical extenuation
or diminution must be calibrated with truth and effective communica-
tion. Quintilian would take up this same line of thought, as would Ben
Jonson and others in the early modern period.
Cicero generally adheres to Plato’s anti-theatricalism. This is most
clear in his retention of the conceptual distinction between orators, and
actors and sophists. The difference, to Cicero, is between emotional
authenticity and inauthenticity, or between the natural and the phan-
tasmal. However, unlike Plato and Aristotle, Cicero is primarily
concerned not with the fact that the theatre privileges actors and fei-
gned emotions instead of truth and character, but that the passions
displayed in the theatre are themselves not true representations of
the agent’s emotions. Cicero’s concern is that an overly enthusiastic
purging of theatrical rhetoric from the orator’s repertoire could impede
the successful deployment of true emotional appeals in the service of
the truth. Cicero therefore sets out to temper what he sees as the ove-
rextended anti-theatricalism of Plato and Aristotle: “My reason for
dwelling on these points” Cicero writes, “is because the whole of
this department has been abandoned by the orators, who are the
players that act real life, and has been taken over by the actors, who
only mimic reality.”59 And later, “because emotion, which mostly
had to be displayed or else counterfeited by action, is often so con-
fused as to be obscured and almost smothered out of sight, we have
to dispel the things that obscure it and take up its prominent and
58Cicero, IV:3.59.
59Cicero, IV:3.57.
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striking points.”60 It is exactly because emotions can be mimicked and
reshaped through theatrics that rulers must deploy the rhetorical arts
to foreground true emotions: “there can be no doubt that reality beats
imitation in everything; and if reality unaided were sufficiently effec-
tive in presentation, we should have no need at all for art.”61
All of this opens the discussion of simulation and dissimulation.
For Cicero, the actor must necessarily dissimulate, because the actor
neither knows his topic nor is truly invested in the consequences of
its publicity. The orator, by contrast, is invested in bringing to light
both the reason and the corresponding passions of his subject; the ora-
tor’s primary concern is philosophical understanding. It is for this rea-
son that Cicero writes that actors are not taken as seriously, or judged
as harshly, as the orator.62 Both are judged by the virtues of their
respective endeavours in the first instance, and by the quality of their
acting/actio in the second. However, unlike the orator, the actor has
no stake in their endeavour.
Alongside Cicero’s discussion of actio is a discussion of the orator-
founder. Cicero’s famous discussion of this figure is found in De
Inventione. In an anthropological account of these figures, Cicero writes:
If we wish to consider the origin of this thing we call eloquence—
whether it be an art, a study, a skill, or a gift of nature—we shall find that
it arose frommost honourable causes and continued on its way from the
best of reasons. . . . For there was a time when men wandered at large in
the fields like animals and lived on wild fare; they did nothing by the
guidance of reason, but relied chiefly on physical strength. . . . And so
through their ignorance and error blind and unreasoning passion satis-
fied itself by misuse of bodily strength, which is a very dangerous ser-
vant. . . . At this juncture a man—great and wise I am sure—became
aware of the power latent in man and the wide field offered by his mind
for great achievements if one could develop this power and improve it
by instruction. Men were scattered in the fields and hidden in sylvan
retreats when he assembled and gathered them in accordance with a
plan; he introduced them to every useful and honorouble occupation,
though they cried out against it at first because of its novelty, and then
when through reason and eloquence they had listened with greater




62Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Oratore, Books I & II, ed. G. P. Goold, trans. E.W.
Sutton and H. Rackham, vol. III, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: William
Heinemann Ltd, 1979), 1.27.125.
63Cicero, De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica, II:1.1–2.
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Just as the extraordinary politics of new foundations for the Greeks
has transformed into a singular mythical act of foundation for the
Romans, the idea of rhetorical action and new foundations has
transformed from an elementally political and extraordinary form
of rhetoric for the Greeks into a mythical, almost magical form of
rhetoric for Cicero. The first polities, Cicero argues, were founded
through great rhetorical feats creating a community of shared
meaning bound by institutional forms. Cicero’s orator-founder is
an outstanding figure in the history of the rhetorical arts, and
early modern rhetoricians picked up this passage with great
enthusiasm.64 This orator-founder is characterized as acting
through oratorical persuasion alone, without resorting to violence,
spectacle, power, charisma, or pre-established authority. Indeed,
Cicero’s orator-founder achieves this extraordinary feat in exclu-
sion from politics and violence. “Certainly,” Cicero writes, “only
a speech at the same time powerful and entrancing could have
induced one who had great physical strength to submit to justice
without violence, so that he suffered himself to be put on a par
with those among whom he could excel, and abandoned voluntar-
ily a most agreeable custom.”65 As noted, in its political mode, it is
this account of rhetorical action that resonates throughout the tra-
dition from this point on. However, it is crucial to register how
radical a reconfiguration of the politics involved is at hand. The
ancient orator-founders had the guide of historical experience to
anchor their understanding of actio, and Aristotle—surely stepping
in the direction of mystification in his account—still had a clear
vision of the politics at hand (however much he struggled to
wrangle them theoretically). Contrastingly in Cicero, the rhetorical
action that constituted the new polity had, like Roman founda-
tions themselves, been relegated to the realm of myth.66 The
mythologization of actio in Cicero’s writings is exemplified nega-
tively by the limited scrutiny it actually receives. Cicero may
praise actio, but he affords only a few pages to the explication of
the technique, paying much more attention to inventio, dispositio,
and elocutio.
From Cicero onwards, we find the fortification of the split in the
history of the concept of actio, which will develop into two apparently
irreconcilable traditions. The first conceives of actio as mere pronunci-
ation and then hand gestures, which, as a result, is necessarily
64Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 93.
65Cicero, De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica, II:1.2.
66Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 207–11.
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abstracted from actual political disputation. The second focuses on the
orator-founder, whose practice becomes essentially mythical and, in
some instances, magical.67 Both pull away from constitutive rhetorical
action in the ancient sense, yet both are persistently discomforted by
the potential of those politics.
In Quintilian, actio remains formally an important part of the rhe-
torician’s arsenal, and the bifurcated and somewhat paradoxical char-
acterization of the concept is retained. The emphasis shifts decisively
away from the orator-founder figure towards an increasingly technical
analysis of the concept itself. Quintilian begins, much in line with
Cicero, in Book XI of Institutio Oratoria, writing that actio
has an extraordinarily powerful effect in oratory. For the nature of the
speech that we have composed within our minds is not so important
as the manner in which we produce it, since the emotion of each member
of our audience will depend on the impression made upon his hearing.
Consequently, no proof, at least if it be one devised by the orator himself,
will ever be so secure as not to lose its force if the speaker fails to produce
it in tones that drive it home. All emotional appeals will inevitably fall
flat, unless they are given the fire that voice, look, and the whole carriage
of the body can give.68
For Quintilian, the power of actio is a function of the relationship
between gestures and the voice, and sight and hearing, respectively,
which are the two senses most strongly linked to the passions.69 Yet,
Quintilian says almost nothing more about actio except in the form of
gestures. One is left with the impression that Quintilian understands
actio as a capstone to a rhetorical performance, as opposed to the key-
stone it was for Cicero.
Quintilian also loosens Cicero’s link between philosophy and
rhetoric, affording a higher standing to acting, and praising the
power of actors to supply substantial emotive force to arguments
they may not understand or believe. Actors, Quintilian notes, “add so
much to the charm even of the greatest powers, that the verse moves
us far more when heard than when read, while they succeed in secur-
ing a hearing even for the most worthless authors.” Quintilian cites
Demosthenes’s famous praise of actio and the value Demosthenes
67There may be a Platonic precursor here as well. In the Euthydemus Plato descri-
bes some public rhetors in ways that characterize the rhetor as an “enchanter” and the
people as exceptional vulgar and eager to be enchanted. See, Vickers, In Defence of
Rhetoric, 137–38.
68Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans. H. E. Butler, vol. IV (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1922), 9.3.1–2.
69Quintilian, IV:9.3.14.
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gained “under the instructions of the actor Andronicus,”70 notably say-
ing nothing of Demosthenes’s political deeds. Having also abandoned
Plato’s strict distinction between knowledge and opinion, Quintilian
advances his own distinction between “true emotion” and “false or
fictitious emotion.” “The former,” Quintilian writes, “breaks out natu-
rally, as in the case of grief, anger, or indignation, but lacks art, and
therefore requires to be formed by methodical training.” “The latter,”
he continues, “does imply art, but lacks the sincerity of nature.”71
Quintilian therefore breaks from the anti-theatricalism introduced by
Plato.72 Nevertheless, Quintilian’s concern is fleeting, speaking not to
its continued importance but rather to its successful subordination to
the vita contemplativa.
REFORMATION AND RENAISSANCE RHETORIC
As the historical practice of new foundations and constitutive rhet-
oric receded ever further into historical memory, the idea of rhetorical
action became both more mundane and more fantastically mythologi-
cal (if not magical). Indeed, the mythological elements slowly came to
be dissociated with rhetoric, while those few aspects that were amena-
ble to codification and instruction came to be considered representa-
tive of the technic. Early modern rhetorical theory marks the apex of
this long historical trend.
Scholars of seventeenth century rhetoric tend not to concern
themselves with the idea of rhetorical action.73 Instead, their focus
is on the three classical rhetorical techniques: inventio (“the devising
of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convinc-
ing”74); disposition, or “arrangement” (“the ordering and distribu-
tion of the matter, making clear the place to which each thing is to
be assigned”75); and elocution, or “style,” (“the adaptation of suit-
able words and sentences to the matter devised”76). But these are
70Quintilian, IV:11.3.2–7.
71Quintilian, IV:11.3.61–3.
72Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans. H. E. Butler, vol. II (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1921), 6.1.26–7.
73To give just one example, in Quentin Skinner’s study of rhetoric in Hobbes he
treats pronunciation only fleetingly where it is understood only in terms of gestures
and enunciation. See, Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 278, but see also 87–90.
74Marcus Tullius [Cicero], Rhetorica Ad Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan, Loeb
Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 1.2.
75[Cicero], 1.2.
76[Cicero], 1.2.
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only three of the five major rhetorical techniques. The other two are
memoria (“the firm retention in the mind of the matter, words, and
arrangement”77) and pronuntiatio, or “delivery” or “actio,” (“the
graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture”78). There
are many good reasons why scholars would focus on inventio, dispo-
sitio, and elocutio. A brief survey of seventeenth century classical rhe-
torical theory quickly reveals that it pays scant attention to
pronuntiatio—due in large measure to that era’s focus on pedagogy,
philosophy, and theology (where the author is the rhetor and the
reader the audience)—wherein pronuntiatio serves a limited function.
Those rhetoricians of the early-modern periodwho do address pronun-
tiatio tend to isolate very specific elements that can be drawn and sche-
matized—for example hand gestures, facial expressions, or posture.
The shining Renaissance example of this is John Bulwer’s Chirologia.79
With few exceptions, studies of the rhetorical arts in this period
concern the private teaching of moral philosophy or formal courtroom
disputation. Thomas Wilson’s The Art of Rhetoric (1560), the first
Ciceronian work of rhetoric printed in English, is exemplary in this
regard. Wilson limits his explication of actio to pronunciation and ges-
tures and to a total of four paragraphs in the conclusion to the third
book of his lengthy study.80 More often, actio is absent, as in Henry
Peacham’s The Garden of Eloquence (1577). Alternatively, actio is treated
in a stylized accounting of gestures, as in John Bulwer’s Chirologia:
Or the Natural Language of the Hand (1644).
Surprisingly, this is true as well for the Ramist rhetorical tradition.
Actio sees something of revival in the hands of Pierre de la Ramée
(Petrus Ramus) andOmer Talon, who reassert the Roman understand-
ing of actio as hand gestures forming an integral element of elocution (or
“striking expression”), therein subdivided into voice and gesture.81
For Ramus and Talon, actio was intended to constitute one of the two
major parts of rhetoric. However, the diagrammatic promise was
belied—as it was in a similar way with Cicero and Quintilian—by a
lack of meaningful consideration. The Ramist rhetorician Dudley
Fenner would—first anonymously in 1584, then under his own name
77[Cicero], 1.2.
78[Cicero], 1.2.
79John Bulwer, Chirologia: Or, The Natural Language of the Hand and Chironomia:
Or, The Art of Manual Rhetoric, ed. James W. Cleary (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1974).
80Thomas Wilson, The Art of Rhetoric, ed. Peter E. Medine (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 218–21.
81Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of
Discourse to the Art of Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 273.
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in 1588—attempt to address this lacuna in his The Artes of Logike and
Rhetorike (the first work of Ramist rhetoric published in English82).
However, Fenner’s influence was limited to the church and the pulpit.
Far more influential were the original works of Ramus and Talon, who
afforded the majority of their attention to textual rhetorical practices.
For this reason, Ong writes that “the irreducibly vocal and auditory
phenomena of actual spoken delivery, which the second part of
rhetoric purportedly taught, escape the diagrammatic apparatus
somehow intrusive in all explanatory approaches to communica-
tion.”83 The result is that “the Ramist ‘plain style’ is a manner of
composition, not of voice and gesture.”84 Actio continued to resist the
philosophers’ grasp, two millennia after Aristotle remarked that it
was likely due to the novelty of the technique that actio had not been
properly considered.
By the mid seventeenth century, the concept of actio in its political
sense as understood by the ancients had been all but lost. In its place
were two highly stylized version of actio, both stemming from
Cicero. The first was that of pronuntiatio. The second, derivative of
Cicero’s ideal orator whose powers are understood as near magical.85
The ancient conception of rhetoric as constitutive politics—expressed
as great political actions—is effectively gone or perfectly mystified.
Consequently, studies of inventio, dispositio, and elocutio dominate the
age. Certainly, one must flag the expansion of the scope of elocutio in
the era to include in elocutio imitations of what was once actio. As
Vicker’s notes, “All the power and skill of the ancient orators was clai-
med by Renaissance writers, so that the ability to move the affections
through language—now written—became a fundamental property
of literature.”86 Oratio had become part of the literary genre “intended
for the reader, not for a live audience.”87 Of course, the shift to thewrit-
ten word is paramount in understanding why actio—and the political
phenomenology previously associated with it—took the form that it
did. Hence, it is widely, if tacitly, agreed that by the 17th century, actio
had reached its nadir. Or, put another way, it was described in similar
terms, but had transformed into a rather different thing altogether: a
petrified and ossified version of its original.
82Emma Annette Wilson, “Fenner, Dudley,” in The Encyclopedia of English
Renaissance Literature, ed. Garrett A. Sullivan and Alan Stewart (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2012).
83Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 273.
84Ong, 273.
85Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 87–93.
86Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 286.
87Vickers, 287.
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However, as I hope to show in the next section—and as I hope the
previous explication of the relationship between the phenomenology
of the vita activa and actio help make clear—there is one place where,
against the classical and Renaissance rhetoricians’ effective displace-
ment of politics and actio, we find a renaissance of actio: the theatre.
Indeed, and in sharp contrast to the tacit agreement, it stands to reason
that it was in fact the rhetoricians’ accounting of actio that had reached
its nadir. Actio itself was experiencing its own renaissance.
THEATRUM RHETORICUM
The story that needs to be told is that of the poets and, more
importantly, the dramatists. From their perspective, the picture looks
quite different. Heinrich Plett writes that “Rhetorical dissembling
manifests itself in words and actions, that is, in the media of elocutio
and actio. In the first case there is a staging of language, in the second
a staging of the body. The rhetorical illusion of the play of the body
falls under the competence of the orator as an actor (and vice versa),
that of the play of language under his competence as a poet (and
vice versa).” He concludes that “here the theatrum rhetoricum becomes
the arena of social and political action.”88 Plett was speaking to the
remarkable explosion in interest in rhetorical action in the early mod-
ern period, rising from underneath—and against—two millennia of
philosophical and theological restraints. In stark contrast to the emaci-
ated theory of actio found in the early modern rhetoricians, early mod-
ern dramatists took up actio with partisan verve against staunch
puritan opposition. Part of this has to do with the specific spatial
politics of the theatre. Their enthusiastic adoption of actio—and the
reconsideration of its place and potential—can be accounted for by
the categorical differences between the place of the schoolroom or
the church and the stage. Dramatists are inherently interested in what
Aristotle found so debased about actio, namely its emotional and
populist power, and radical capacity for moral reconstruction
against established norms. In the history of actio, this period marks
a decisive point of contestation.
From the mid–sixteenth to the mid–seventeenth century, the the-
atre went through multiple phases of expression and repression.89
88Heinrich F. Plett, Rhetoric and Renaissance Culture (Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 252.
89The classic work on this is Jonas Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985).
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Throughout this period, numerous tracts were published both in sup-
port of and in opposition to acting and the theatre. In this respect, the
seventeenth century theatrical debate is something of a re-enactment
of the ancient contest between Plato and the founders and politicians.
The seventeenth century version of this battle was carried out between
puritan anti-theatricalism—bolstered by royal censure—and the early
modern dramatists. The puritans took up the Platonic critique with
fanatic enthusiasm. For example, in A Treatise Against Dicing, Dancing,
Plays, and Interludes, with Other Idle Pastimes (1577), John Northbrooke
had “Age” tell “Youth”:
I am persuaded that Satan has not a more speedy way and fitter school
to work and teach his desire, to bring men and women into his snare of
concupiscence and filthy lusts of wicked whoredom, than those places,
and plays, and theaters are: and therefore it is necessary that those pla-
ces and players should be forbidden and dissolved and put down by
authority, as the brothel houses and stews are.90
Likewise, in School of Abuse (1579), Stephen Gosson makes no less
colourful an attack:
Let us but shut up our ears to poets, pipers, and players; pull our feet
back from resort to theaters, and turn away our eyes from beholding
of vanity; the greatest storm of abuse will be overblown, and a fair path
trodden to amendment of life. Were not we so foolish to taste every
drug, and buy every trifle, players would shut in their shops, and carry
their trash to some other country.91
Similar condemnations are repeated throughout subsequent decades,
taking a most vitriolic form in William Prynne’s Histriomastix: The
Player’s Scourge (1633).92
What is striking about these attacks is that the highly technical
understanding of actio is of marginal concern. Instead, what one finds
is a concern with theatre as real political power, one that has a wide
audience, and can undermine established political institutions through
mere rhetorical persuasion. It is indicative of the perception that theat-
rical rhetoric had a role in upending and supplanting moral, social, and
political norms. In seventeenth century England, the theatre was
90John Northbrooke, “A Treatise Against Dicing, Dancing, Plays, and Interludes,
with Other Idle Pastimes [1577],” in Shakespeare’s Theater: A Sourcebook, ed. Tanya
Pollard (Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 2–3.
91Stephen Gosson, “School of Abuse [1579],” in Shakespeare’s Theater: A
Sourcebook, ed. Tanya Pollard (Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 28.
92William Prynne, “Histriomastix: The Player’s Scourge [1633],” in Shakespeare’s
Theater: A Sourcebook, ed. Tanya Pollard (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 279–286.
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viewed as destructive of themoral and political order. Critics of the the-
atre perceived identities as being peddled like “drugs,” a critique sto-
ked by the increasing powerlessness of the pulpit in shaping public
opinion.93 The exception to this rule was, of course, dramatists and
poets themselves. Against the state- and church-supported attacks
levelled against them, the dramatists defended their art. At the core
of that defense was a defense of actio.
One of the earliest defenses of the theatre is found in George
Puttenham’s The Art of English Poesie, published in 1589, but likely
written in the 1560s. Puttenham was no radical, but against the staun-
chest anti-theatrical criticisms, he redeploys Aristotle’s guarded
defense in Poetics of poetry’s socially constructive potential in the polit-
ical and moral affairs of the regime. In 1595, Philip Sydney published
An Apology for Poetry, written in response to Gosson’s earlier attack.
Following Puttenham, Sydney emphasizes the potential of theatrical
mimesis as a tool for disciplinarymoral pedagogy through the spectac-
ular re-enactment of the true and the good. Sydney goes further than
Puttenham or Aristotle in extending his defense of poetry to the tech-
niques of invention and ornamentation, with an emphasis on meta-
phors and analogies, to bring out poetry’s moral and aesthetic
potential. Echoing Cicero, Sydney writes that “Nature never set forth
the earth in so rich tapestry as diverse poets have done,” continuing
that, “neither with pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet smelling flowers,
nor whatsoever else may make the too much loved earth more lovely.
Her world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden.” And later:
“Now therein of all sciences . . . is our poet the monarch. For he doth
not only show the way, but giveth so sweet a prospect into the way
as will entice any man to enter into it.”94 But unlike Cicero, Sydney
argues that the power of poetry and the poet is to make the truth of
nature more evident than it appears. Sydney is exemplary of early
modern dramatists not only in mimicking the ancients, but also in
actively contributing to rhetorical theory.
The dramatists understood tragedy as especially well attuned
to the danger of tyranny because, through actio, the poet “openeth
the greatest wounds and showeth forth the ulcers that are covered
with tissue, that maketh kings fear to be tyrants, and tyrants mani-
fest their tyrannical humors.” Sydney gives the example of “how
much it can move” by recalling Plutarch’s story of the “abominable
tyrant Alexander Pheraeus, from whose eyes a tragedy well made
and represented drew abundance of tears, who without all pity
93Gosson, “School of Abuse [1579],” 28.
94Philip Sidney, “An Apology for Poetry [1595],” in Shakespeare’s Theater: A
Sourcebook, ed. Tanya Pollard (Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 149.
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had murdered infinite numbers, and some of his own blood: so as
he that was not ashamed to make matters for tragedies, yet could
not resist the sweet violence of a tragedy.”95 Theatrical mimesis—
including the use of rhetorical ornamentation and amplification,
but actualized in actio—was, for Sidney, a great tactical advantage
conferred only on the theatre, since it allowed for a depiction of
nature at once clearer and more assertive than nature itself.96 All of
the above is set out in clear light of the popularity of Plato’s critique
of poetry, which was then being brandished against the poets.97
InAnApology for Actors (1612), ThomasHeywood took up a similar
defense, while focusing on themimetic potential of theatre. Heywood’s
foremost contention is that the theatre could augment regal power,
instead of undermining it. Heywood is also notable for his embrace
of the theatrical set as the medium of symbolic representation. To this
end, Heywood notes, dramatists should not adopt the minimalist mise
en scène that the Greeks practiced and Aristotle advocated, instead
adopting elaborate set designs as integral to the mimetic experience.
He argues that the court could be legitimated through the spectacle of
great acts of regal glories, and that actio—in conjunction with elaborate
staging—was the most effective rhetorical mode for representing the
court’s grandeur. Theatrical representation of the ancient “worthies”
was to be deployed to “effect the like wonders in the princes of our
times,” which, Heywood continues, “can no way be so exquisitely
demonstrated, nor so lively portrayed, as by action.”98 Actio is required
because
a description is only a shadow received by the ear, but not perceived by
the eye; so, lively portraiture is merely a form seen by the eye, but can
95Sidney, 151.
96Although there is some continuity between Sydney’s praise of poetics and the
theatre, we should be careful not to project this praise of the stage too far. As Barish
notes, Sydney was as often dismissive of the “naughtie Play-makers and Stage-
keepers.” Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice, 117. Concerning this same episode,
Plett writes,
The perfected art of acting, which manifests itself in the movere of the spectator,
depends on a realistic imitatio vitae . . . ‘Realistic’ in this context means ‘energetic,’
a rhetorical term to which English dramas of the Renaissance often appeal with
such phrases as ‘acted to life’ or ‘lively action.’ An energetic performance is char-
acterized by a mimesis that is not only true to reality but above all effective. This
is the essence of rhetorical realism. (Plett, Rhetoric and Renaissance Culture, 266.)
97Sidney, “An Apology for Poetry [1595],” 152–59.
98Thomas Heywood, “An Apology for Actors [1612],” in Shakespeare’s Theater: A
Sourcebook, ed. Tanya Pollard (Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 220 [this quota-
tion was originally styled as a rhetorical question. I have adjusted the punctuation].
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neither show action, passion, motion, or any other gesture, to move the
spirits of the beholder to admiration. But to see a soldier shaped like a
soldier, walk, speak, act like a soldier; to see a Hector all besmeared in
blood, trampling upon the bulks of kings . . . Oh, these were sights to
make an Alexander.99
For Heywood, the theatre is a place of productive mimetic description
and re-description, where identities can be constituted and stabilized.
“So bewitching a thing is lively and well spirited action,” Heywood
writes, “that it hath power to new mold the hearts of the spectators
and fashion them to the shape of any noble and notable attempt.”100
The question for Heywood is not one of authentic versus inauthentic
identities—to Heywood, identities are always enacted—but rather
one of power and politics, and of controlling the means through which
identities are enacted, adjudicated, and reified.
Heywood collapses Cicero’s distinction between the actor and the
orator, and he does so against the humanist rhetoricians’ downplaying
of actio as mere pronunciation.101 Thus, he writes:
These wise men of Greece (so called by the oracle) could, by their indus-
try, find out no nearer or directer course to plant humanity and manners
in the hearts of the multitude than to instruct them by moralized myster-
ies what vices to avoid; what virtues to embrace; what enormities to
abandon; what ordinances to observe; whose lives (being for some spe-
cial endowments in former times honored) they should admire and fol-
low; whose vicious actions (personated in some licentious liver) they
should despise and shun: which, borne out as well by the wisdom of
the poet as supported by the worth of the actors, wrought such impres-
sion in the hearts of the plebe that in short space they excelled in civility
and government, insomuch that from them all the neighbor nations
99Heywood, 220.
100Heywood, 227.
101Interestingly, Heywood considers actio as sixth form of rhetoric, presumably
because of the sharp discrepancy between what actio did mean for the ancients and
what it came to mean in Heywoods time. He writes:
Tully, in his book Ad Caium Herennium, requires five things in an orator: inven-
tion, disposition, elocution, memory, and pronunciation, yet all are imperfect
without the sixth, which is action. For be his invention never so fluent and exqui-
site, his disposition and order never so composed and formal, his eloquence, and
elaborate phrases never so material and pithy, his memory never so firm and
retentive, his pronunciation never so musical and plausive; yet without a comely
and elegant gesture, a gracious and a bewitching kind of action, a natural and a
familiar motion of the head, the hand, the body; and a moderate and fit counte-
nance suitable to all the rest, I hold all the rest as nothing. (Heywood, 227.)
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drew their patterns of humanity, as well in the establishing of their laws
as the reformation of their manners.102
Heywood’s focus was not only on the orator-founders and poets,
but more broadly the great virtuous acts found in the annals of antiq-
uity. The stage enabled the power of spectacle (opsis) in the moulding
of identity and in the undertaking of great political acts. As with the
representatives of the political variant of actio, virtue and awe are con-
joinedwith rhetoric in a sovereign-conducted, power-augmenting spec-
tacle. “If we present a tragedy,”Heywood writes, “we include the fatal
and abortive ends of such as commit notoriousmurders, which is aggra-
vated and acted with all the art that may be, to terrify men from the
like abhorred practices.” And later, “if a moral, it is to persuade men
to humanity and good life, to instruct them in civility and good man-
ners, showing them the fruits of honesty, and the end of villainy.”103
Another playwright who attempted to calibrate humanism with
theatrical rhetoric was Ben Jonson. But unlike many of his theatrical
contemporaries, Jonson was distrustful of the theatre as a philosophical
and pedagogical medium.104 Like Aristotle, Jonson was concerned that
irrespective of the depth of his philosophical understanding of the topic
at hand, the success of the play was ultimately contingent on the play-
goers, over whom Jonson had little control. Due to the fickle power of
the playwright over the audience, Jonson held ample suspicion of the
theatre as a medium to communicate the basic moral truths of nature.
Nevertheless, Jonson joins Heywood in acknowledging the significant
normative potential of the theatre in its public capacity in the regulation
and fortification of agency and political life. Hence, Jonson did not dis-
miss or resist spectacle, and rhetorical actio as Aristotle counselled.
Jonson, instead, set to put it under his control.105
For this reason, Jonson rejected Aristotle’s appeal to minimalist
mise en scène. Rather than setting his plays in Rome or Athens,
Jonson’s great innovation was to use London as their backdrop,
which allowed the setting to become an essential element of the
play.106 For example, in Bartholomew Fair, Jonson complicates the pol-
loi/aristoi distinction to show the essential debasement that marks the
equality of men, while the “Paul’s Walk” scene of Every Man out of
102Heywood, 225–6.
103Heywood, 241.
104Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice, 135.
105Aristotle, Poetics, 1450b.
106Ben Jonson, Every Man Out of His Humour, ed. Helen Ostovich (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2001), 41–2 [editor’s introduction].
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His Humour, Helen Ostovich notes, “demonstrates that the hungry
predators and parasites lurk in all classes and occupations.” These
social and moral criticisms are not of another society; they take place
within the mikrokosmos of St. Paul’s cathedral. There, the characters
interact and negotiate their relative socio-political lives “as an obses-
sively competitive dance.”107 St. Paul’s stands “as a rhetorical locus
communis,” a site where meaning is contended, asserted, reified, and
displaced.108 Had Jonson set these plays in Athens or Rome, the cri-
tique would be projected onto an alien community. In using London,
Jonson turns the critical moral reflections back on the audience.
Jonson was trying to address the atechnic elements of the theatrical
experience—for Jonson, the morally, politically, philosophically, and
aesthetically depraved multitude—into the play itself. Thereby, the
representation of the polity is made an entechnic aspect of theatrical
rhetoric, and the multitude—at least the immanent representation of
the multitude—could be partially placed under the control of the play-
wright. The theatre house opened up a space for political and moral
perspectivism, and thereby political and moral judgment. The play-
within-a-play technique and the power of rhetorical mimesis provided
Jonson with a powerful venue to stake his humanist claims.
Jonson thought that dramatists should not deploy simulation and
dissimulation in the service of deception. Rather, Jonson presupposes a
basic morality that will be evident to the audience throughout. His
works are not philosophical exegeses on the good and the true; they
are spectacles of that which is obviously virtuous, and that which is
obviously debased. Jonson assumes the task of the educator, of guid-
ing his audience to that which they know already. As one commenta-
tor noted, for Jonson the “poet’s task is to strengthen that intuition by
leading it from such simple evaluations to far more complex moral
judgments; and that the aesthetic recognition to which poetic logic
appeals is also present in every man, because it is the twin of that
moral recognition the poet activates, both born of the impulse toward
the Good which makes man human.”109 Jonson’s goal was moral ped-
agogy, and the intention was to enable a mimetic play wherein the
multitude could be coaxed towards a sort of proxy humanism. This
was, for Jonson, the special burden of the poet.
107Jonson, 59 [editor’s introduction].
108Jonson, 60 [editor’s introduction].
109Gabriele Bernhard Jackson, Vision and Judgment in Ben Jonson’s Drama
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 161.
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CONCLUSION
Rhetorical action, in its highest form, amounts to a capacity to
deconstruct and reconstruct the normative order of a regime by trans-
forming the underlying political identity of its people. Its medium is
human plurality and the public spheres that emergewhere people con-
gregate. At its core, this is a question of parameters. Rhetorical actio is a
parameter-setting mode of rhetoric. Rhetorical theory, by contrast, has
unfolded, functioning within those parameters. It is for that reason
that actio has often been seen as being the singular mode of rheto-
ric, but yet has avoided theoretical subordination and technical
refinement.
Greek political philosophy was inaugurated as an assault upon
those constitutive politics, and a world of mystification, degradation,
and abuse has followed. And yet, as quickly as Plato went to war
against the idea, it was also of enduringly compelling interest. Plato
concedes as much by appropriating the city-building metaphor in
the service of philosophy. But the original assault was of enduring
significance, and the historical shift away from politics and toward tex-
tual modes of persuasion conspired to sunder the formal accounting of
actio into mythical, magical, vulgar, mundane and technical concerns.
We see this struggle in Aristotle, who signaled the importance of rhe-
torical action but, quite uncharacteristically, conceded that it remains
an essentially untheorized and only partially understood form of per-
suasion. Many others—from Cicero onwards—have proclaimed the
importance of rhetorical action, but most have failed to develop it.
We see this negatively in the renaissance accounts of rhetoric as either
magical or as mundane hand gestures. It was only at that period that
Bulwer’s Chirologia could finally give a thoroughgoing technical
account of actio only to reveal that its technical nature had little to do
with its promised power. If the early modern rhetoricians finally over-
came the paradox of the persistent resistance of actio to theoretical sub-
ordination, they did so only because the idea had become petrified,
and they had to start anew. Consequently, rhetoricians (and pedago-
gues and theologians) of the early modern period adhered to an ema-
ciated theory of rhetorical action. Indeed, they were likely flummoxed
by the ancients’ persistent warnings regarding the immense power of
actio to found cities and persuade the vulgar masses. That account
makes up the lion’s share of historical reflections on early modern
accounts of rhetorical action.
It was only once the political space of the theater was opened
anew that the constitutive function of rhetorical action was revived.
This is not by chance, I believe. The theatre is not only a public place,
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it is a microcosm for constituting new political spaces allowing for
experimentation in parameter creation and the world of politics that
follows. When the dramatists looked for precursors, they would have
certainly paid attention to the technical discussions of gesticulation in
the early modern period. But when they followed those ideas back to
their source, they found a groundswell of far more vibrant theories
and practices. Indeed, the dramatists and poets not only revived the
ancient notion, but updated it and pushed it into new directions. As
both the dramatists and poets—and their legion of adversaries—
agreed, the emergence of the theatre as a social and public space strip-
ped the tradition of its mystifications, by revealing that actio in public
could command significant ethical, social, and political power. It could
constitute new political identities. If the standing theories of actio evo-
ked fantastic notions of great rhetorical power—but presented mun-
dane accounts of hand gestures—theatrical practices afforded actio
new and concrete meaning, and very quickly its constitutive potential
as an elemental political power was rediscovered.
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